CHAPTER 33

Performing Gender Identity: Young Men’s Talk and the Construction of Heterosexual Masculinity

Deborah Cameron (1997)

People in every society have ideas, or ideologies, about the ways men and women are supposed to act, and about how they talk. There are also ideas about what kind of talk is valued, whether it is talk that conveys information or talk that furthers a relationship (see Chapter 34 and Unit 6). Along with gender roles are ideas about sexuality. In the United States, masculinity is associated with heterosexuality.

Using Judith Butler’s ideas of performativity, in which humans enact gender through activity rather than simply reiterating something previously given, Deborah Cameron ana-
lyzes parts of a conversation recorded by a student in one of her classes, pointing out ways that any equation of “support” with women is inadequate for understanding all the ways gender is performed. Rather, speakers draw on linguistic resources available to all as members of many communities to accomplish certain aims in certain circumstances.

Reading Questions:
- What does Cameron observe in the conversation Danny recorded that Danny had over-
looked? How does she explain his partial understanding of the conversation?
- What is the difference between “rapport talk” and “rapport talk”? Which is typically asso-
ciated with women? Which does Cameron see in this conversation, and how does she define it?
- What do the five men talk about, besides wine, women, and sports, and how do they do it?
- Why does Cameron say that the conversation is “not only about masculinity, it is a sus-
tained performance of masculinity”? Why does she insist that the conversation is not in a “feminine” conversational style, despite its resemblance to many conversations among women?

In 1990, a 21-year-old student in a language and gender class was testing at a college in the southeastern U.S., recording a sequence of conversations among five men: himself and four friends. This young man, whom I will call “Danny,” had decided to investigate whether the informal talk of male friends would bear out generalizations about “men’s talk” that were often encountered in discussions of gender differences in conversational style—for example that it is competitive, hierarchically organized, centered on “impersonal” topics and the exchange of information, and foregrounds speech genres such as joking, trading insults, and sports statistics.

Danny reported that the stereotype of all-male interaction was borne out by the data he recorded. He gave his paper the title “Wine, women, and sports.” Yet although I could agree that the data did contain the stereotypical fea-
tures he reported, the more I looked at it, the more I saw other things in it too. Danny’s analysis was not inaccurate; his conclusions were not unwarranted, but his description of the talk was (in both senses) partial: it was shaped by expec-
tations that caused some things to leap out of the record as “significant,” while other things went unremarked.

I am interested in the possibility that Danny’s selective reading of his data was not just the understandable error of an inexperienced analyst. Analysis is never done without preconceptions, we can never be absolutely non-selective in our observations, and where the object of observation and analysis has to do with gender it is extraordinarily difficult to subdue certain expectations.

One might speculate, for example, on why the vignettes of “typical” masculine and feminine behavior presented in popular books like Deborah Tannen’s You Just Don’t Understand (1990) are so often apprehended as immediately recognizable? Is it because we have actually witnessed these scenarios occurring in real life, or is it because we can so readily supply the cultural script that makes them meaningful and “typical”? One argument for the latter possibility is that if you reverse the genders in Tannen’s anecdotes, it is still possible to supply a script which makes sense of the alleged gender difference. For example, Tannen remarks on men’s reluctance to ask for directions while driving, and attributes it to men’s greater concern for status (asking for help sug-
gests helplessness). But if, as an experiment, you tell people it is women rather than men who are more reluctant to ask for directions, they will have no difficulty coming up with a differ-
ent and equally plausible explanation—for instance that the reluctance reflects a typically feminine desire to avoid imposing on others, or perhaps a well-founded fear of stop-
ping to talk to strangers.

What this suggests is that the behaviour of men and women, whatever its substance may happen to be in any specific instance, is invariably read through a more general discourse on gender difference itself. That discourse is sub-
sequently invoked to explain the pattern of gender differ-
entiation in people’s behaviour; whereas it might be more enlightening to say the discourse constructs the differen-
tiation, makes it visible as differentiation.

I want to propose that conversationalists themselves often do the same thing: I have just suggested analysts do. Analysts construct stories about other people’s behaviour, with a view to making it exemplify certain patterns of gen-
der differentiation: conversationalists construct stories about themselves and others, with a view to performing certain kinds of gender identity.

IDENTITY AND PERFORMATIVITY

In 1990, the philosopher Judith Butler published an influen-
tial book called Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. Butler’s essay is a postmodernist reconceptual-
ization of gender, and it makes use of a concept familiar to linguists and discourse analysts from speech-act theory: performativity. For Butler, gender is performative—in her suggestive phrase “constituting the identity it is purported to be.” Just as J. L. Austin (1962) maintained that illocu-
tions like “I promise” do not describe a pre-existing state of affairs but actually bring one into being, so Butler claims that “feminine” and “masculine” are not what we are, nor traits we have, but effects we produce by way of particular things we do. Gender is the repeated stylization of the body, a set of repeated acts within a rigid regulatory frame which congeal over time to produce the appearance of substance, of a ‘natural’ kind of being” (p. 33).

This extends the traditional feminist account whereby gender is socially constructed rather than “natural” famously expressed in Simone de Beauvoir’s dictum that “one is not born, but rather becomes a woman.” Butler is saying that “becoming a woman” (or a man) is not something you accomplish once and for all at an early stage of life. Gen-
er has constantly to be reaffirmed and publicly displayed by repeatedly performing particular acts in accordance with the cultural norms (these historically and socially con-
structed, and consequently variable) which define “mascu-
linity” and “femininity.”

This “performative” model sheds an interesting light on the phenomenon of gendered speech. Speech too is a “repeated stylization of the body”; the “masculine” and “feminine” styles of talking identified by researchers might be thought of as the “congealed” result of repeated acts by social actors who are striving to constitute themselves as “proper” men and women. Whereas sociolinguistics tradi-
tionally assumes that people talk the way they do because of who they (already) are, the postmodernist approach sug-
gests that people are who they are because of (among other things) the way they talk. This shifts the focus away from a simple cataloguing of differences between men and women to a subtler and more complex inquiry into how people use linguistic resources to produce gender differentiation. It also oblige us to attend to the “rigid regulatory frame” within which people must make their choices—the norms that define what kinds of language are possible, intelligible, and appropriate resources for performing masculinity or femi-
ninity.

A further advantage of this approach is that it acknowledges the instability and variability of gender identities, and therefore of the behaviour in which those identities are performed. While Judith Butler rightly insists that gender is regulated and policed by rather rigid social norms, she does not fully accept the implications. She writes: "...women and men who are linguistically equipped to produce gender difference."

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Using Judith Butler’s idea of performativity, in which humans enact gender through activity rather than simply reiterating something previously given, Deborah Cameron analyzes parts of a conversation recorded by a student in one of her classes, pointing out ways that her essay on “rapport talk” with women is inadequate for understanding all the ways gender is performed. Rather, speakers draw on linguistic resources available to all as members of many communities to accomplish certain aims in certain circumstances.

Reading Questions:
- What does Cameron observe in the conversation Danny recorded that Danny had overlooked?
- What is the difference between “rapport talk” and “rapport talk”? Which is typically associated with women? Does Cameron see in this conversation, and how does she explain it?
- What does she mean by “rapport talk”?
- What is the point of the argument in this conversation?

In 1990, a 21-year-old student in a language and gender class I was teaching at a college in the southern U.S. tape-recorded a sequence of casual conversations among five men: himself, four friends. This young man, whom I will call “Danny,” had decided to investigate whether the informal talk of male friends would bear out generalizations about “men’s talk” that are often encountered in discussions of gender differences in conversational style—for example that it is competitive, hierarchically organized, centers on “imperios” topics and the exchange of information, and foregrounds speech genres such as joking, trading insults, and sports statistics.

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What this suggests is that the behaviour of men and women, whatever its substance may happen to be in any specific instance, is invariably read through a more general discourse on gender difference itself. That discourse is subsequently invoked to explain the patterns of gender difference in people’s behaviour; whereas it might be more enlightening to say the discourse constructs the differentiation, makes it visible as differentiation.

I want to propose that constructionists themselves often do the same thing I have just suggested analysts do. Analysts construct stories about other people’s behaviour, with a view to making it exemplify certain patterns of gender difference; constructionists construct stories about themselves and others, with a view to performing certain kinds of gender identity.

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This extends the traditional feminist account whereby gender is socially constructed rather than “natural” famously expressed in Simone de Beauvoir’s dictum that “one is not born, but rather becomes a woman.” Butler is saying that “becoming a woman” (or a man) is not something you accomplish once and for all at an early stage of life. Gender has constantly to be reterritorialized and publicly displayed by repeatedly performing particular acts in accordance with the cultural norms (themselves historically and socially constructed, and consequently variable) which define “masculinity” and “femininity.” This “performative” model sheds an interesting light on the phenomenon of gendered speech. Speech too is a “repeated stylization of the body”; the “masculine” and “feminine” styles of talking identified by researchers might be thought of as the “congealed” result of repeated acts by social actors who are striving to constitute themselves as “proper” men and women. Whereas sociolinguistics traditionally assumes that people talk the way they do because of who they (already) are, the postmodernist approach suggests that people are who they are because of (among other things) the way they talk. This shifts the focus away from a simple cataloging of differences between men and women to a subtler and more complex inquiry into how people use linguistic resources to produce gender differentiation. It also obliges us to attend to the “rigid regulatory frame” within which people must make their choices—the norms that define what kinds of language are possible, intelligible, and appropriate resources for performing masculinity or femininity.

A further advantage of this approach is that it acknowledges the instability and variability of gender identities, and therefore of the behaviour in which those identities are performed. While Judith Butler rightly insists that gender is regulated and policed by rather rigid social norms—men and women to automate, programmed by their early socialization to repeat forever the appropriate gendered behaviour, but treats them as conscious agents who may—albeit often at a social cost—engage in acts of transgression, subversion, and resistance. As active producers rather than passive reproduces of gendered behaviour, men and women may use their awareness of the gendered meanings that attach to particular ways of speaking and acting to produce a variety of effects. This is important, because few, if any, analysts of data on men’s and women’s speech would maintain that the differences are as clear-cut and invariant as one might gather from such oft-cited dichotomies as “competitive/cooperative” and “report talk/rappport talk.” People do perform gender differently in different contexts, and do sometimes behave in ways we would normally associate with the “other” gender. The conversation to which we now turn is a notable case in point.
The Conversation: Wine, Women, Sports… and Other Men

The five men who took part in the conversation, and to whom I will give the pseudonyms Al, Bryan, Carl, Danny, and Ed, were demographically a homogeneous group, white, middle-class American suburbanites aged 21, who attended the same university and belonged to the same social network on campus. This particular conversation occurred in the context of one of the men’s course-related leisure activities: watching sports at home on television.

Throughout the period covered by the tape-recording there is a basketball game on screen, and participants regularly make reference to the game in the conversation. Some of these references are only implicit, and do not interrupt the flow of ongoing talk on some other topic; sometimes they lead to extended discussion. At all times, however, it is a legitimate conversational move to comment on the basketball game. The student who collected the data drew attention to the status of sport as a resource for talk available to North American men of all classes and racial/ethnic groups, to strangers as well as friends, suggesting that "sports talk" is a typically "masculine" conversational genre in the USA, something all culturally competent males know how to do.

But "sports talk" is by no means the only kind of talk being done. The men also recount the events of their day—what classes they had and how those went; they discuss mundane details of their daily arrangements, such as who is going to pick up groceries; there is a debate about the merits of a certain kind of wine; there are a couple of longer narratives, notably one about an incident when two men sharing a room each invited a girlfriend back without their roommates’s knowledge—and discovered this at the most embarrassing moment possible. Danny’s title "Wine, women, and sports" is accurate insofar as all these subjects are discussed at some length.

When one examines the data, however, it becomes clear there is one very significant omission in Danny’s title. Apart from basketball, the single most prominent theme in the recorded conversation, as measured by the amount of time devoted to it, is "gossip": discussion of several persons not present but known to the participants, with a strong focus on critically examining these individuals’ appearance, dress, social behaviour, and sexual strategies. Like the conversationalists themselves, the individuals under discussion are all men. Unlike the conversationalists, however, the individuals under discussion are identified as "gay." The topic of "gay" is raised by Ed, only a few seconds in the taped-recording conversation:

Ed: Muggy Gompers (.) my name is Lloyd Gompers I am a homosexual (.) you know what the (.) I saw the new Remington (.) I should have grabbed you know the title (.)

Like the head of a...?

"Muggy Gompers" (the name of a basketball player) is an acknowledgement of the previous turn, which concerned

which they complain that "four homos" are continually "hit- ing on" [making sexual overtures to] one of the women, described as a "blond bitch in the history of the world.
One might have thought that a defining feature of "a homo" would be his lack of interest in "hitting on" women. Yet no one seems aware of any contradiction in this exchange. I think this is because the deviance indicated for this group by the term "gay" is not so much sexual deviance as gender deviance. Being "gay" means failing to measure up to the group’s standards of masculinity or femininity. This is why it makes sense to call someone "really gay": unlike same-sex versus other-sex preference, conformity to gender norms can be a matter of degree. It is also why hitting on an "ugly-ass bitch" can be classed as "homosexual" behaviour—presumably because the object of public sexual interest is not just female, but minimally attractive.

Applied to the group, "gay" refers in particular to insufficiently masculine appearance, clothing, and speech. To illustrate this I will reproduce a longer sequence of conversation about the "really gay guy in our Age of Revolution class," which ends with Ed declaring: "he’s the antithesis of man."

Bryan: uh you know that really gay guy in our Age of Revolution class who sits in front of us he wore shorts again by the way it’s like 42 degrees out he wore shorts again [laughter] [Ed: That guy it’s like a speedo, he wears a speedo to class (.) he’s like [French cut spandex] (Ed: It’s worse) you know

Ed: = you know like those shorts women volleyball players wear? it’s like those (.) it’s like [French cut spandex]

Bryan: you wear those shorts and a like a parka on… (5 lines omitted)

Bryan: he’s got some condition that he’s got to like have his legs exposed at all times or else he’s got really good legs (.) he’s probably he’s like [he really likes

Ed: = he’s like at home combing his leg hairs

Bryan: = his legs

Bryan: he doesn’t have any leg hair though? = yes and oh = the really likes

Bryan: = very long very white and very skinny

Bryan: those ridiculous Reeboks that are always (indecipherable) and white socks always striped = [tube socks]

Ed: = that’s (right)

Ed: = he’s the antithesis of man

In order to demonstrate that certain individuals are "the antithesis of man," the group engages in a kind of conversation that might well strike us as the antithesis of "men’s talk." It is unlike the wine, "sports talk," stereotype of men’s talk—indeed, rather closer to the stereotype of "women’s talk"—in various ways, some obvious, and some less so.

The obvious ways in which this sequence resembles conventional notions of "women’s talk" concern its purpose and subject-matter. This is talk about people, not things, and "rapport talk" rather than "report talk"—the main point is clearly to exchange information. It is "gossip," and serves one of the commonly alleged functions of gossip, namely affirming the solidarity of an in-group by constructing absent others as an out-group, whose behaviour is minutely examined and found wanting.

The specific subjects on which the talk dwells are conventionally "feminine" ones: clothing and bodily appearance. The men are caught up in a contradiction: their criticism of the "gay" centre on their uniformity in displaying their bodies, and the inappropriate garments they choose for this purpose (bathing costumes worn to class, shorts worn in cold weather with parkas which render the effect ludicrous, clothing which resembles women’s volleyball players). The implication is that real men just pull up their jeans and leave it at that. But in order to pursue this line of criticism, the conversationalists themselves must show an acute awareness of such "unmasculine" styles and materials. ("French cut spandex," "tube socks," what kind of clothes go together, and which men wear "good legs." They are impelled, paradoxically, to talk about men’s bodies as a way of demonstrating their own total lack of sexual interest in those bodies. The less obvious ways in which this conversation departs from stereotypical notions of "men’s talk" concern its formal features. Analyses of men’s and women’s speech style are commonly organised around the idea of global oppositions, e.g., "men’s talk is competitive," whereas women’s is "cooperative." Talk that makes men talk to gain "status," whereas women talk to forge "intimacy" and "connection"; men do "report talk" and women "rapport talk." Analysis of gossip opposes two oppositions typically identify certain formal or organizational features of talk as markers of "competition," and "cooperation," etc. The analyst then examines which kinds of features predominate in a set of conversational data, and how they are being used. In the following discussion, I too will make use of the conventional oppositions as tools for describing data, but I will be trying to build up an argument that their use is problematic. The problem is not simply that the men in my data fail to fit their gender stereotype perfectly. More importantly, I think it is often the stereotype itself that underwrites analytic judgements that a certain form is cooperative rather than competitive, or that people are seeking status rather than connection in their talk. As I observed about Deborah Tannen’s vignettes, many instances of behaviour will support either construction, or both, the use the speaker’s gender, and our beliefs about what sort of behaviour makes sense for members of that gender, to rule some interpretations in and others out.
The five men who took part in the conversation, and to whom I will give the pseudonyms Al, Bryan, Carl, Danny, and Ed, were demographically a homogeneous group white, middle-class American suburbanites aged 21, who attended the same university and belonged to the same social network on campus. This particular conversation occurred in the context of an event that focused on leisure activities: watching sports at home on television. Throughout the period covered by the tape-recording there is a basketball game on screen, and participants regularly make reference to action on the game. Some of the references are just brief interjections, which do not disrupt the flow of ongoing talk on some other topic; sometimes they lead to extended discussion. At all times, however, it is a legitimate conversational move to comment on the basketball game. The student who collected the data drew attention to the status of sport as a resource for talk available to North American men of all classes and racial/ethnic groups, to strangers as well as friends, suggesting that "sports talk" is a "typically masculine" conversational genre in the US, something all culturally competent males know how to do.

But "sports talk" is by no means the only kind of talk being done. The men also recount the events of their day—what classes they had and how these went; they discuss mundane details of their daily arrangements, such as who is going to pick up groceries; there is a debate about the merits of a certain kind of wine; there are a couple of longer narratives, notably one about an incident when two men sharing a room each invited a girlfriend back without their roommates' knowledge—and discovered this at the most embarrassing moment possible. Danny's title "Wine, women, and sports" is accurate insofar as all these subjects are discussed at some length. When one examines the data, however, it becomes clear there is one very significant omission in Danny's title. Apart from basketball, the single most prominent theme in the recorded conversation, as measured by the amount of time devoted to it, is "gossip": discussion of several persons not present but known to the participants, with a strong focus on critically examining these individuals' appearances, dress, social behaviour, and sexual mores. Like the conversationists themselves, the individuals under discussion are all men. Unlike the conversationalists, however, the individuals under discussion are identified as "gay." The topic of "gay" is raised in Ed, only a few seconds in to the tape-recorded conversation:

Ed: Gay, Bogues. (my name is) Lloyd Bogmers I am a homosexual (.) you know what the (.) I saw the new Rembrandt (.) I should have grabbed you know the title! Like the heading?

"Mupgy Bogues" (the name of a basketball player) is an acknowledgement of the previous turn, which concerned

which they complain that "four homos are continually "hit-ting on" [making sexual overtures to one of the women, described as a "bitch" in a bunch of eight in the history of the own group]. One might have thought that a defining feature of a "homo" would be his lack of interest in "hitting on" women. Yet no one seems aware of any contradiction in this exchange. I think this is because the deviance indicated for this group by the term "gay" is not so much sexual deviance as gender deviance. Being 'gay' means failing to measure up to the group's standards of masculinity or femininity. This is why it makes sense to call someone "really gay": unlike same-sex-versus-other-sex preference, conformity to gender norms can be a matter of degree. It is also why hitting on an "ugly-ass bitch" can be classed as "homossexual" behaviour—provided the motive is that the object of public sexual interest is not just female, but minimally attractive. Applied to the group by men, "gay" refers in particular to insufficiently masculine appearance, clothing, and speech. To illustrate this I will reproduce a longer sequence of conversation about the "real gay guy in our Age of Revolution class," which ends with Ed declaring: "he's the antithesis of man."

Bryan: you know that really gay guy in our Age of Revolution class who sits in front of us? he wore shorts again by the way, it's like 42 degrees out he wore shorts again [laughter] Ed: [That guy] he's like a speedo, he wears a speedo to class (.) you know what's like (.) he's really skinny legs [Ed: it's worse] you know what's like (.)

Bryan: you know what's even more ridiculous? When [French cut spandex]

Ed: [French cut spandex] Bryan: you wear those shorts and a like a parka on... (5 lines omitted)

Bryan: he's like he's got some condition that he's got to like have his legs exposed at all times or else he's got really good legs (.)

Ed: [French cut spandex] he's probably he's like (.)

Bryan: he's like he's at home combing his leg hairs (.)

Ed: he doesn't have any leg hair though (.)

Bryan: he's really really likes (.)

Ed: [French cut] his legs (.)

Ed: very long very white and very skinny

Bryan: those ridiculous Reeboks that are always (indecent) and [white socks always stripped] (.)

Ed: that's (right)

Ed: he's the antithesis of man.
Cooperation

Various scholars, notably Jennifer Coates (1989), have remarked on the “cooperative” nature of informal talk among female friends, drawing attention to a number of linguistic features which are prominent in data on all-female groups. Some of these, like hedging and the use of epistemic modals, are signs of attention to others’ face, aimed at minimizing conflict and securing agreement (cf. Holmes 2006). Others, such as latching of turns, simultaneous speech where this is not interpreted by participants as a violation of turn-taking rights (cf. Edelsky 1981), and the repetition or recycling of lexical items and phrases across turns, are signals that a conversation is “sustained” in that participants are building on one another’s contributions so that ideas are felt to be group property rather than the property of a single speaker.

On these criteria, the conversation here must be judged as highly cooperative. For example, in the extract reproduced above, a strikingly large number of turns (around half) begin with “you know” and/or contain the marker “like” (“you know like those short women volleyball players wear?”). The functions of these items (especially “like”) in younger Americans’ English are complex and multiple, and may include the cooperative, mitigating-face-protecting functions that Coates and Janet Holmes (1984) associate with hedging. Even where they are not clearly hedges, however, in this interaction they function in ways that relate to the building of group involvement and consensus. They often seem to mark information as “given” within the group’s discourse (that is, “you know,” “like,” “uh...” that I am addressing is indeed familiar with X); “you know” has the kind of hearer-oriented affective function (taking others into account or inviting their agreement) which Holmes attributes to certain tag questions; while “like” in addition seems to function for these speakers as a marker of high involvement. It appears most frequently when the interlocutors are, by other criteria such as intonation, pitch, loudness, speech rate, incidence of simultaneous speech, or the use of taboo language, notably excited, such as the following:

Ed: he’s me mean he like a real artf darty fag he’s like
(dreph) he’s gay he’s got this really high
voice and wire rim glasses and he sits next to the
ugliest ass bitch in the history of the world

Ed: [and]
Bryan: [and they’re all hitting on her too, like four
Ed: I know it’s like four homos hitting on her
Bryan: guys [hitting on her]

It is also noticeable throughout the long extract reproduced earlier how much latching and simultaneous speech there is, as compared to other forms of turn transition involving shorter or longer periods of interruptions which silence the interruptee. Latching of turn transition without pause or overlap— is often taken as a mark of cooperation because in order to latch a turn so precisely onto the preceding turn, the speaker has to attend closely to others’ contributions.

The last part of the reproduced extract, discussing the “real gay” guy’s legs, is an excellent example of jointly produced discourse, as the speakers cooperate to build a detailed picture of the legs and what is seen on them, a picture which overall could not be attributed to any single speaker. This sequence contains many instances of latching, repetition of one speaker’s words by another speaker (Ed recycles Carl’s whole turn, “he really likes his legs” with added emphasis), and it also contains something that is relatively rare in the conversation as a whole, repeated tackles of heater support like “yes” and “that’s right.”

There, then, are elements of resemblance worth remarking on between these men’s talk and similar talk among women as reported by previous studies. The question does arise, however, whether this male conversation has the other important hallmark of women’s gossip, namely egalitarian or non-hierarchical organization of the floor.

Competition

In purely quantitative terms, this conversation cannot be said to be egalitarian. The extracts reproduced so far are representative of the whole insofar as they show Ed and Bryan as the dominant speakers, while Al and Carl contribute fewer and shorter turns (Danny is variable; there are sequences where he contributes very little, but when he talks he often contributes turns that want to involve Bryan, and he also initiates topics). Evidence thus exists to support an argument that there is a hierarchy in this conversation, and there is competition, particularly between the two dominant speakers, Bryan and Ed (as we see in the excerpt Ed and Danny). Let us pursue this by looking more closely at Ed’s behaviour.

Ed introduces the topic of homosexuality, and initially attempts to keep “ownership” of it. He cuts off Danny’s first remark on the subject with a reference to The Remnant: “what was the article? cause you know they bashed them then they were like.” At this point Danny interrupts it is clearly an interruption because in this context the preferred interpretation of “like” is quotative, that is, it repeats what the gay-bashing in The Remnant said. In addition to interrupting so that Ed falls silent, Danny contradicts Ed, saying “they actually (.) cut them into big.” A little later on during the discussion of the Gay Ball, Ed makes use of a common competitive strategy, the joke or witty remark which “caps” other contributions (the “flowers and fruits” joke quoted above). This, however, elicits no laughter, no matching jokes, and indeed no take of any kind. It is followed by a pause and a change of direction if not of subject, as Danny begins the gossip that will dominate talk for several minutes.

This immediately elicits a matching contribution from Bryan. As he and Danny talk, Ed takes two unsuccessful attempts to regain the floor. One, where he utters the predatory remark “I’m gonna be very honest,” is simply ignored. His second strategy is to ask (about the person Bryan is talking to, Daisy): “what’s this guy’s last name?” First Bryan asks him to repeat the question, then Danny replies “I don’t know what the hell it is.”

A similar pattern is seen in the long extract reproduced above, where Ed makes two attempts to interrupt Bryan’s turn at the beginning of Bryan’s turn (“that’s gay” and “It’s worse”), neither of which suc-

ceeds. He gets the floor eventually by using the “you know like” strategy. And from that point, Ed does orient more to the norms of joint production: he overlaps others to pro-

duce simultaneous speech but does not interrupt; he pro-

duces more latched turns, recycles, and support tokens. Since the Ed is arguing that even if the speakers, or some of them, compete, they are basically engaged in a col-

laborative and solidarity enterprise (reinforcing the bonds within the group by denigrating people outside it), an activ-

ity in which Ed is a major player, and even if some are more active than others. Therefore I have not drawn attention to the display of the presence of “cooperative” features, and have argued that more extreme forms of hierarchical and competitive behav-

ior are not rewarded by the group. I could, in fact, have argued that by the end, Ed and Bryan are not so much “com-

peting” — after all, their contributions are not antagonistic to one another but tend to reinforce one another—as engaging in a version of the “joint production of discourse.”

Yet the data might also support a different analysis in which Ed and Bryan are simply using the collaborative enterprise of putting down gay men as an occasion to engage in verbal jousting. Ed and Bryan are scored—against fellow group members regardless than against the gay men—by dominating the floor and coming up with more and more extravagant put-downs. In this alternative analysis, Ed does not mean to collaborate with Bryan in “degrading gays” in the way that Bryan’s “joint production” or “verbal duelling”—how do we decide?

Deconstructing Oppositions

One response to the problem of competing interpretations raised above might be that the opposition I have been working with—“cooperative” behaviour—is inherently problematic, particularly if one is taken to exclude the other. Conversation can and usually does contain both cooperative and competitive elements: one could argue (along with Grice (1975)) that talk must by definition involve a minimum of cooperation, and also that there will usually be some degree of competition among speakers, if not for the floor itself then for the attention or the approval of others (see also Hewitt 1997).

The global competitive/cooperative opposition also encourages the lumping together under one heading or the other of things that could in principle be distinguished. “Cooperation” might refer to a agreement on the aims of talk, respect for others’ speakers’ right, or support for their contribu-

tions; but there is not always perfect co-occurrence among these aspects, and one can attribute the need not rule out a “competitive” element. Participants in a conversation or other speech event may compete with each other and at the same time be pursuing a shared project or common agenda in a ritualised fashion, they may be in severe disagreement but punctiliously observant of one

another’s speaking rights (as in a formal debate), they may be highly supportive, and at the same time covertly hoping to score points and gain advantage.

This last point is strangely overlooked in some discus-

sions of women’s talk. Women who pay solicitous attention to one another’s face are not seeking connec-

tion or good social relations rather than status: yet one can surely argue that attending to others’ face and attending to one’s own are not mutually exclusive here. The “egalitarian” norms of female speech contain all norms, to some degree coercive; the rewards and punishments precis-

ely concern one’s status within the group (among women, however, this status is called “popularity” rather than “domi-

nance”). As the following extract is a case in point, the correct degree of concern for others, and lose status by displaying too little concern for others and too much for herself. Argua-

bly, it is gender-stereotyping that causes us to miss or mini-

mize the status-seeking element in women friends’ talk, and the connection-making dimension of men.

How to Do Gender with Language

I hope it will be clear by now that my intention in analysing male gossip is not to suggest that the young men involved have adopted a ‘feminine’ conversational style. On the contrary, what I will suggest as I progress is that women need to concern us with the implications of such a style. To characterize the conversation I have been considering as “feminine” on the basis that it bears a significant resemblance to conversa-

tions amongst women is a mistake. It misses two very important point about it, that it is not only about masculi-

nity, it is a sustained performance of masculinity. What is important in gendering talk is the “performative gender work” the talk is doing. Its role in constituting people as gendered subjects.

To put matters in these terms is not to deny that there may be an empirically observable association between a certain genre or style of speech and speakers of a particu-

lar gender. In practice this is useless. But we do need to ask; in virtue of what does the association hold? Can we give an account of why particular gendered practices are not for some hold? For it seems to me that conversations like the one I have analysed leave, say, Deborah Tannen’s contention that men do not do “womens talk,” because they simply do not know how, looking lame and unconvincing. If men rarely engage in a certain kind of talk, an explanation is called for; but if they do engage in it even very occasionally, an expla-

nation in terms of pure ignorance will not do.

I suggest that the explanation. Men and women do not live on different planets, but are members of cultures in which a large amount of discourse about gender is constant in circulating. They do not only learn, and they do not do something wrong if they happen to engage in activities that are “appropriate” to their own sex; they learn a much broader set of gendered meanings that attach in rather complex ways to different ways of speaking, and they produce their own behaviour in the light of those meanings.
Cooperation

Various scholars, notably Jennifer Coates (1989), have remarked on the "cooperative" nature of informal talk among female friends, drawing attention to a number of linguistic features which are prominent in data on all-female groups. Some of these, like hedging and the use of epistemic modals, are signs of attention to others' faces, aimed at minimizing conflict and securing agreement [cf. Holmes 2006]. Others, such as latching of turns, simultaneous speech where this is not interpreted by participants as a violation of turn-taking rights [cf. Edelzyk 1981], and the repetition or recycling of lexical items and phrases across turns, are signals that a conversation is "j話" that participants are building on one another's contributions so that ideas are felt to be group property rather than the property of a single speaker.

On these criteria, the conversation here must be judged as highly cooperative. For example, in the extract reproduced above, a strikingly large number of turns (around half) begin with "you know" and/or contain the marker "like" ("you know that short women volleyball players wear?").

The functions of these items (especially "like") in younger Americans' English are complex and multiple, and may include the cooperative, mitigating/face-protection functions that Coates and Janet Holmes (1984) associate with hedging. Even where they are not clearly hedges, however, in this interaction they function in ways that relate to the building of group involvement and consensus. They often seem to mark information as "given" within the group's discourse (that is, "you know, "like", "you know that short women volleyball players wear").

It is not clear what addressese this phrase is, in fact familiar with X; you know has the kind of hearer-oriented affective function (taking others into account or inviting their agreement) which Holmes attributes to certain tag questions; while "like" in addition seems to function for these speakers as a marker of high involvement. It appears most frequently when the interlocutors are, by other criteria such as intonation, pitch, loudness, speech rate, incidence of simultaneous speech, us of jargon or taboo language, noticeably excited, such as the following:

**ED**

he's like a real arty farty guy he's like (indeed) he's so gay he's got this really high voice and wire rim glasses and he sits next to the ugliest ass bitch in the history of the world

**BRYAN**

and

**ED**

and they're all sitting on her too, like four

**ED**

I know it's like four homos sitting on her

**BRYAN**

guys (hitting on her)

It is also noticeable throughout the long extract reproduced earlier how much latching and simultaneous speech there is, as compared to other forms of turn transition involving short or long stretches of gap or interruptions which silence the interruptee. Latching, turn transition without pause or overlap—is often taken as a mark of cooperation because in order to latch a turn so precisely onto the preceding turn, the speaker has to attend closely to others’ contributions.

The last part of the reproduced extract, discussing the "real gay" guy's legs, is an excellent example of jointly produced discourse, as the speakers cooperate to build a detailed picture of the legs and what is seen on them, a picture which overall could not be attributed to any single speaker. This sequence contains many instances of latching, repetition of one speaker's words by another speaker (Ed recycles Carl's whole turn, "he really likes his legs" with added emphasis, and it also contains something that is relatively rare in the conversation as a whole, repeated turns of speaker heard like "yes" and "that's right")

There are, then, elements of resemblance worth remarking on between these men's talk and similar talk among women as reported by previous studies. The question does arise, however; whether this male conversation has the other important hallmark of women's gossip, namely egalitarian or non-hierarchical organization of the floor.

Competition

In purely quantitative terms, this conversation cannot be said to be egalitarian. The extracts reproduced so far are representative of the whole insofar as they show Ed and Bryan as the dominant speakers, while Al and Carl contribute fewer and shorter turns (Danny is variable; there are sequences where he contributes very little, but when he talks he often contributes turns, but want to make contributions (continue) that are easier to hear. Bryan, and he also initiates topic). Evidence thus exists to support an argument that there is a hierarchy in this conversation, and there is competition, particularly between the two dominant speakers, Bryan and Ed (as against Ed and Danny). Let us pursue this by looking more closely at Ed's behaviour.

Ed introduces the topic of homosexuality, and initially attempts to keep "ownership" of it. He cuts off Danny's first remark on the subject with a reference to The Remnant: "what was the article? cause you knew they bashed them they were like." At this point Danny interrupts it is clearly an interruption because in this context the preferred interpretation of "like" is quotative or a kind of quote what repetition is in The Remnant. Said in addition to interrupting so that Ed falls silent, Danny contradicts Ed, saying "they didn't actually (...) cut them into big". A little later on during the discussion of the Gay Ball, Ed makes use of a common competitive strategy, the joke or witty remark which "caps" other contributions (the "flowers and fruits" joke quoted above). This, however, elicits no laugh, no matching joke, and indeed no take of any kind. It is followed by a pause and a change of direction if not of subject, as Danny begins the gossip that will dominate talk for several minutes.

This immediately elicits a matching contribution from Bryan. As he and Danny talk, Ed makes two unsuccessful attempts to regain the floor. One, where he utters the prefatory remark "I'm gonna be very honest," is simply ignored. His second strategy is to ask (about the person Bryan was discussing) "what's this guy's last name?" First Bryan asks him to repeat the question, then Danny replies "I don't know what the hell it is"

Another speaker's rights (as in a formal debate), they may be more supportive, and at the same time covertly hoping to score points against their opponents.

This last point is strangely overlooked in some discussions of women's talk. Women who pay solicitous attention to one another's face are also being seeking connec tion or good social relations rather than status; yet one can surely argue that attending to others' face and attending to one's own are not mutually exclusive here. The "egalitarian" norms of women's talk are not universal norms of all, norms to some degree coercive: the rewards and punishments precisely concern one's status within the group (among women, however, this status is called "popularity" rather than "dominance"). The following explanation by cases where it is not correct degree of concern for others, and lose status by displaying too little concern for others and too much for herself. Argua bly, it is gender-stereotyping that causes us to miss or mini mize the status-seeking element in women friends' talk, and the connection-making dimension of men.

How to Do Gender with Language

I hope that I am clear now that my intention in analysing male gossip is not to suggest that the young men involved have adopted a "feminine" conversational style. On the contrary, Ed and Bryan's talk is more in keeping with the sort of talk that I want to make concerns the folly of making any such claim. To characterize the conversation I have been considering as "feminine" on the basis that it bears a significant resemblance to conversations among all-male groups, is to miss the most important point about it, that it is not only about masculinity, it is a sustained performance of masculinity. What is important in gendering talk is the "performative gender work" the talk is doing, its role in constituting people as gendered subjects.

To put matters in these terms is not to deny that there may be an empirically observable association between a certain genre or style of speech and speakers of a particular gender. In practice this is undesirable. But we do need to ask: in virtue of what does the association hold? Can we give an account of the phenomenon where women do not hold? Not for it seems to me that conversations like the one I have analysed leave, say, Deborah Tannen's contention that men do not do "women's talk", because they simply do not know how, looking lame and unconvincing. If men rarely engage in a certain kind of talk, an explanation is called for; but if they do engage in it ever even occasionally, an explanation in terms of pure ignorance will not do.

I suggest that this is true of all men, and women who do not live on different planets, but are members of cultures in which a large amount of discourse about gender is constantly circulating. They do not only learn, and learn more or less the same ways of being "appropriate" to their own sex; they learn a much broader set of gendered meanings that attach in rather complex ways to different ways of speaking, and they produce their own behaviour in the light of those meanings.
This behaviour will vary. Even the individual who is most unambiguously committed to traditional notions of gender has a range of possible gender identities to draw on. Performing masculinity or femininity "appropriately" cannot mean giving exactly the same performance regardless of the circumstances. It may involve different strategies in mixed and single-sex company, in private and in public settings, in the various social positions (parent, lover, professional, friend) that someone might regularly occupy in the course of everyday life.

Since gender is a relational term, and the minimal requirement for "being a man" is "not being a woman," we may find that in many circumstances, men are under pressure to constitute themselves as masculine linguistically by avoiding forms of talk whose primary association is with women/femininity. But this is not invariant, which begs the question: Under what circumstances does the contrast with women lose its salience as a constraint on men's behaviour? When can men do so-called feminine talk without threatening their constitution as men? Are there cases when it might actually be to their advantage to do this?

**When and Why Do Men Gossip?**

Many researchers have reported that both sexes engage in gossip, since its social functions (like affirming group solidarity and serving as an unofficial conduit for information) are of universal relevance, but its cultural meaning (for us) is undeniably "feminine." Therefore we might expect to find most men avoiding it, or disguising it as something else, especially in mixed settings where they are concerned to mark their difference from women (see Johnson and Finlay 1997). In the conversation discussed above, however, there are no women for the men to differentiate themselves from; whereas there is the perceived danger that so often accompanies western male homosociality: homosexuality. Under these circumstances perhaps it becomes acceptable to transgress one gender norm ("men don't gossip, gossip is for girls") in order to affirm what this context is a more important norm ("men in all-male groups must unambiguously display their heterosocial orientation").

In these speakers' understanding of gender, gay men, like women, provide a contrast group against whom masculinity can be defined. This principle of contrast seems to set limits on the possibility of gossip for these young men. Although they discuss other men besides the "gays"—professional basketball players—they could not be said to gossip about them. They talk about the players' skills and their records, not their appearance, personal lives, or sexual activities. Since the men admire the basketball players, identifying with them rather than against them, such talk would border dangerously on what for them is obviously taboo: desire for other men.

Ironically, it seems likely that the despaired gay men are the only men about whom these male friends can legitimately talk among themselves in such intimate terms without compromising the heterosexual masculinity they are so anxious to display—though in a different context, say with their girlfriends, they might be able to discuss the basketball players differently. The presence of a woman, especially a heterosexual partner, displaces the dread spectre of homosexuality, and makes other kinds of talk possible; though by the same token her presence might prevent certain kinds of talk that take place among men impossible. What counts as acceptable talk for men is a complex matter in which all kinds of contextual variables play a part.

In this context—a private conversation among male friends—it can be argued that gossip, either about your sexual exploits with women or about the repulsiveness of gay men (these speakers do both), is not just one way, but the most appropriate way to display heterosexual masculinity. In another context (in public, or with a larger and less close-knit group of men), the same objective might well be pursued through explicitly agonistic strategies, such as yelling abuse at women or gays in the street, or exchanging sexist and homophobic jokes. Both strategies could be said to do performative gender work: in terms of what they do for the speakers involved, one is not more "masculine" than the other; they simply belong to different settings in which heterosexual masculinity may (or must) be put on display.

**Conclusion**

I hope that my discussion of the conversation I have analysed makes the point that it is unhelpful for linguists to continue to use models of gendered speech which imply that masculinity and femininity are monolithic constructs, automatically giving rise to predictable (and utterly different) patterns of verbal interaction. At the same time, I hope it might make us think twice about the sort of analysis that implicitly seeks the meaning (and sometimes the value) of an interaction among men or women primarily in the style, rather than the substance, of what is said. For although, as I noted earlier in relation to Judith Butler's work, it is possible for men and women to performatively subvert or resist the prevailing codes of gender, there can surely be no convincing argument that this is what Danny and his friends are doing. Their conversation is animated by entirely traditional anxieties about being seen at all times as red-blooded heterosexual males: not women and not queers. Their skill as performers does not alter the fact that what they perform is the same old gendered script.

**Transcription Conventions**

- "latching"
- "turn onset overlaps previous turn"
- "turn is completely contained within another speaker's turn"
- "rising intonation on utterance"
- "short pause"
- "indecipherable"
- "stress on italicized item"

**Notes**

1. Because the student concerned is one of the speakers in the conversation I analyse, and the nature of the conversation makes it desirable to conceal participants' identities (indeed, this was one of the conditions under which the data were collected and subsequently passed on to me), I will not give his real name here, but I want to acknowledge his generosity in making his recording and transcript available to me, and to thank him for a number of insights I gained by discussing the data with him as well as by reading his paper. I am also grateful to the other young men who participated. All their names, and the names of other people they mention, have been changed, and all pseudonyms used are I believe entirely fictitious.

2. I base this assessment of reader response on my own research with readers of Tannen's book (see Cameron 1995: Chapter 3), on non-scholarly reviews of the book, and on reader studies of popular self-help books (e.g., Lichterman 1992; Simonds 1992).

3. I am indebted to Penelope Eckert for describing this "thought experiment," which she has used in her own teaching (though the specific details of the example are not an exact rendition of Eckert's observations).

4. It is a rather consistent finding that men use such minimal responses significantly less often than women, and in this respect the present data conform to expectations—there are very few minimal responses of any kind. I would argue, however, that active listener involvement, in support and not absent in the talk of this group, they are marked by other means such as high levels of latching/summative speech, lexical recycling, and the use of like.

**References**


**Post-reading Questions / Activities**

What can we learn from a close look at the details of conversation that would not be evident from listening to a conversation? What special tools are needed?

What are the functions of gossip? Is gossip gendered?

What does Cameron mean when she contrasts the traditional assumption of sociolinguists that "people talk the way they do because of who they (already) are," with the assumption of postmodernists, that "people are who they are because of (among other things) the way they talk? What would be the implications of such a viewpoint for social analysis?

Record a conversation among friends. Transcribe it carefully, omitting names of speakers. Have someone else read it. Is it possible to determine the speakers' genders? How?

**Vocabulary**

- latching
- mutating
- performativity
- quotative
- tag question
- turn
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**References**


Johnson, S. and Finlay, F. (1997) "Do men gossip?


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