Modern social movements developed with the creation of the nation-state, and the nation-state has for many years been the main target for protest. Although social movements have often pushed for a conception of “direct” democracy, the institutions and actors of representative democracy have long structured movements’ political opportunities and constraints within the boundaries of institutional politics. In fact, for most of the history of the modern national state, political parties were the main actors in democratic representation, linking the formation of collective identities with representative institutions. But at the turn of the millennium, nation-states face a host of new challenges:

- From without, there is the contemporary challenge of terrorism and the rejection of pluralistic and secular government on the part of broad sectors of the world’s population;
- from within, there is both widespread disaffection from conventional forms of politics and disillusionment with the active state;
- linking these internal and external challenges are the uncertainties of new forms of internationalization and globalization that connect citizens to a global market but reduce their control over their own fates.

Although the power of the nation-state has by no means disappeared, since the 1960s, social, cultural, and geopolitical changes have begun to transform social movements’ institutional and cultural environments. In particular, there has been a shift in the locus of political power—a shift symbolized by the growing use of concepts like “multilevel governance,”
“the world polity,” and “global civil society,” which point to the following internal and external developments. *Internally*, there has been a continuing shift in power from parliaments to the executive, and, within the executive, to the bureaucracy and to quasi-independent agencies. Power has moved from mass-parties to parties that have been variously defined as “catchall,” “professional-electoral,” or “cartel” parties (for a review, see della Porta, 2001), and therefore from party activists to the “new party professionals.” *Externally*, there has been a shift in the locus of institutional power from the national to both the supranational and the regional levels, with the increasing power of international institutions, especially economic ones (World Bank, International Monetary Fund [IMF], World Trade Organization [WTO]), and some regional ones (in Europe, the European Union [EU]; in the Western hemisphere, the North American Free Trade Agreement [NAFTA]).

Meanwhile, informal networks have spread across borders (such as international agreements on standards; nongovernmental organization [NGO] coalitions in the areas of human rights, the environment, and peace; and, in a darker vein, drug and human trafficking networks). Many see a shift in the axis of power from politics to the market, with neoliberal economic policies increasing the power of multinational corporations and reducing the capacity of traditional state structures to control them. Taken together, these changes have led to the development of a system of “complex internationalism,” which provides both threats and opportunities to ordinary people, to organized nonstate actors, and to weaker states, as we shall argue in our conclusions.

How are social movements reacting to these power shifts in terms of their organizational structures, their collective action frames and identities, and their repertoires of action? At first, scholars assumed that international movements would be similar to those that had developed within the nation-state. More recently, a growing stream of research on social movements has identified three important processes of transnationalization: diffusion, domestication, and externalization. By diffusion, we mean the spread of movement ideas, practices, and frames from one country to another; by domestication, we mean the playing out on domestic territory of conflicts that have their origin externally; and by externalization, we mean the challenge to supranational institutions to intervene in domestic problems or conflicts.

These processes are all important and appear to be widespread. However, the recent evolution of movements focusing on “global justice,” peace and war, or both, suggests some additional processes. The most important of these, and the one that emerges most clearly from the chapters in this book, is what we call “transnational collective action”—that is, coordinated international campaigns on the part of networks of activists against
international actors, other states, or international institutions. In the first section of this introduction, we will rapidly survey findings on the three better-known processes of diffusion, domestication, and externalization. In the second section, we will try to specify how the process of transnational collective action has developed in recent years. In the third section, we will suggest some hypotheses about its forms and dynamics. In the fourth section, we will summarize the contributions to the volume.

DIFFUSION, DOMESTICATION, AND EXTERNALIZATION

Three broad processes link transnational politics today to the traditions of social movement studies in the past and lay the groundwork for the major changes that we see occurring in the contemporary world.

Diffusion

Diffusion is the most familiar and the oldest form of transnational contention. It need not involve connections across borders, but only that challengers in one country or region adopt or adapt the organizational forms, collective action frames, or targets of those in other countries or regions. Thus, the "shantytown" protests that were used to demand American universities' divestiture from South Africa were a domestic example of diffusion (Soule, 1999), while the spread of the "sit-in" from the American civil rights movement to Western Europe was a transnational one (Tarrow, 1989). Research on protest in Belgium, France, and Germany has also indicated the existence of important cross-national diffusion effects (Reising, 1999:333).

A variant on diffusion is what Tarrow and McAdam, in chapter 6, call "brokerage," through which groups or individuals deliberately connect actors from different sites of contention. This process was evident as early as the spread of the antislavery movement from England to the European continent in the late eighteenth century (Drescher, 1987) and, in more recent history, in the transfer of the American student movement's themes and practices to West Germany, through students who had studied in the United States in the 1960s (McAdam and Rucht, 1993). In their contribution, Tarrow and McAdam identify the brokerage elements that built the Zapatista solidarity network around the world after the Chiapas rebellion of 1994.

One of the factors that characterizes the new international system is the greater ease with which particular practices or frames can be transferred from one country to another through cheap international travel, the
knowledge of common languages, and access to the Internet (Bennett, 2003, and chapter 9 in this volume). But underlying these advantages lies a disadvantage. Every new form of communication both heightens ties between those who already know one another, and raises the walls of exclusion for those lacking access to the new medium of communication (Tilly, 2004). Not only that: although it is undoubtedly easier and faster for information about protest to be communicated across national lines today than it was fifty years ago, the Internet also creates the risk of diffuseness, as those with Internet skills learn to mount their own websites and set themselves up as movement entrepreneurs. In general, research indicates that sustained diffusion processes both require and help to produce transnational networks and identities, to which we will turn in the next section.

Internalization

By internalization, we mean the playing out on domestic territory of conflicts that have their origin externally. Previous research on protest events, collected mainly from newspaper sources from Western Europe, stressed the small number of protests that target international institutions directly. A good part of this research focused on the EU. Using Reuters World News Service and the Reuters Textline, Doug Imig and Sidney Tarrow (2001; also see 1999) found a limited (but growing) number of such protests. Similarly, in Germany, Dieter Rucht (2002a) observed a low (and declining) proportion of protests aimed at the international level (with the high point coming in 1960–1964) or at EU institutions. Meanwhile, Marco Giugni and Florence Passy (2002) noted how rarely protests on migrant rights targeted the EU, notwithstanding the increasing Europeanization of legal competences regarding border control. Even environmental action was rarely turned on Brussels: protests with EU targets ranged from 0.8 percent in Italy to 4.6 percent in Germany in the last decade, with no discernible increasing trend (Rootes, 2002). Similarly, few protest events have addressed international organizations other than the EU.

Protest events analysis, however, indicated that protest often addressed national governments regarding decisions that originated or were implemented at a supranational level. In their analysis of protest in Europe, Doug Imig and Sidney Tarrow (2001) found that most EU related events (406 out of 490) were in fact cases of domestication—that is, conflict about EU decisions, but mounted at the national level. And processes of domestication in fact characterized many mobilizations of European farmers (Bush and Simi, 2001). Outside of Europe, as well, many important mobilizations against international institutions followed a similar dynamic. The anti-IMF “austerity protests” of the 1980s took a largely domesti-
cated form (Walton, 2001). Recent Argentine protests were similarly triggered by the pressure of international financial institutions but directed against domestic institutions (Auyero, 2003).

The low level of protest targeting the supranational level might be explained by the political opportunities available to collective actors at other territorial levels of government. In addition, the undeniable “democratic deficit” of international institutions—lacking both electoral responsiveness and accountability in the public sphere (Eder, 2000)—plays an important role. Such mobilizations might in fact be seen as proof of the continued dominance of the nation-state. However, a more careful look shows the emergence, in the course of these campaigns, of innovations both in the organizational structure and in the frames of the protest (della Porta, 2003a), as we will see below.

**Externalization**

A third area in which researchers have observed the emergence of clear transnational trends is in studies focusing on movement organizations that become active supranationally. Within this approach, scholars of international relations have analyzed informational and lobbying campaigns in which national and international NGOs attempt to stimulate international alliances with nationally weak social movements (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; see also chapter 7 in this volume). These researchers stress that organized interests and social movements look to international institutions for the mobilization of resources that can be used at the national level. A variant is the construction of transnational coalitions of international NGOs, which reach into these institutions to find allies on behalf of the claims of weak domestic actors in countries of the South (Fox and Brown, 1998).

The strategy of externalization (Chabanet, 2002) has often characterized the mobilization of national groups targeting the EU in attempts to put pressure on their own governments for material or symbolic resources. For instance, British environmental organizations paid increasing attention to the EU (even playing a leading role vis-à-vis other environmental groups) when political opportunities at home were poor (Rootes, 2002; see also Rootes in this volume). To give another example, with their Euro-strike in 1997, Spanish, French, and Belgian Renault workers protested at the EU level against the closing of the Renault factory of Vilvorde in Belgium (Lefébure and Lagneau, 2002).

Some international institutions have indeed emerged as arenas for the articulation of collective claims (Smith, Chatfield, and Pagnucco, 1997). On the rights of indigenous populations or women, the United Nations seems able to produce international norms that, though weaker than
national regulation, can be used to strengthen and legitimize these groups’ claims (see Soysal, 1994). In Western Europe, the European Parliament has worked as a main channel of access for various organizations, especially in areas like the environment, in which parliamentary committees are active. Feminists, environmentalists, and unions have also been able to obtain favorable decisions from the European Court of Justice, especially with the increasing competence of the EU with respect to environmental and social policies (Dehousse, 1998; Balme and Chabanet, 2002).

In their dealings with international institutions, some movement organizations receive material and symbolic resources, such as the financing of particular projects, or recognition of their legitimacy. On their side, international institutions benefit from low-cost work from voluntary associations; from the information they can provide; from access to local populations; and, of course, from legitimization (for instance, Mazey and Richardson, 1997:10). For the institutionally weak European Parliament, alliances with NGOs provide resources for legitimization vis-à-vis the more powerful European Commission and the European Council. Similarly for the United Nations, NGOs active on human rights help a weak bureaucracy to acquire specialized, and, in general, reliable knowledge, while development NGOs offer high-quality, low-cost human resources (for a summary, see della Porta and Kriesi, 1999).

Externalization processes have, however, some limits. First of all, “boomerangs” and “insider/outside coalitions” are more likely to emerge when “(1) channels between domestic groups and their governments are blocked or hampered or where such channels are ineffective for resolving a conflict, setting into motion a ‘boomerang’ pattern . . . (2) advocates believe that networking will further their missions and campaigns, and actively promote networks; and (3) conferences and other forms of international contact create arenas for forming and strengthening networks” (Keck and Sikkink, 1998:12). Moreover, they are potentially more effective for movements focusing on internationally established norms (such as human rights) than for those struggling against internationally hegemonic discourse (such as the liberalization of markets for goods and services).

To summarize: these three forms of transnational relations represent an important part of what some scholars have been calling “global social movements” and what others, more modestly, call “transnational politics.” They are extremely important, and may be increasing in scope and scale, but they do not represent the most dramatic change we see in the world of contentious politics. This is what we call “transnational collective action,” to which we turn in the following section.
TRANSNATIONAL COLLECTIVE ACTION

Transnational collective action is the term we use to indicate coordinated international campaigns on the part of networks of activists against international actors, other states, or international institutions. Both in Western Europe, where it takes a more institutionalized form, and outside Europe, where more vigorous forms have developed in recent years, we see it developing out of the more traditional forms that we have outlined above. We can vividly illustrate this development of new forms from old with the example of anthropologist Hilary Cunningham, who has studied activism on the U.S./Mexican border for over ten years. She began in the early 1990s by studying the “border crossing” of a group of activists linked to the U.S. Sanctuary movement, who offered safe havens to Central American refugees. She compares this experience to more recent activism to reduce the negative effects of the NAFTA agreement (2001:372–79). Between these two episodes, both occurring on the same border and involving the same populations, Cunningham observed a shift from a state-centric movement to a transnational coalition (379–83). In fact, as the movement developed, the role of the state was transformed for its activists. This transformation developed out of environmental, cognitive, and relational changes. We can use these categories to examine the forces behind the development of transnational collective action.

Environmental Change

Since the late 1980s, three kinds of changes in the international environment have helped to produce a transnationalization of collective action. First, the collapse of the Soviet bloc encouraged the development of forms of nonstate action that had previously been blocked by Cold War divisions. This produced a wave of Western governmental support for NGO activity in both East-Central Europe and the former Soviet Union (Mendelson and Glenn, 2002), as well as the development of homegrown non-state groups that might otherwise have been branded as “pro-communist” in the days of the Cold War. At the same time, the explosion of secessionist movements, border wars, and warlordism that followed the breakup of the Soviet bloc fed an increase of humanitarian aid movements around the world.

Second, the development of electronic communications and the spread of inexpensive international travel have made it easier for formerly isolated movement actors to communicate and collaborate with one another across borders. Related to this, there has been a massive increase in migration flows across borders, which has stimulated both benign forms of
immigrant activism (Guarnizo, Portes, and Landolt, 2003) and the more transgressive forms of diasporic nationalism that have exacerbated ethnic and linguistic conflicts (Anderson, 1998).

Finally, the importance of the international environment has been highlighted by the growing power of transnational corporations and international institutions, treaties regulating the international economy, and international events like the global summits of the World Bank, the Group of Eight, and especially the World Trade Organization. These are of course framed by activists as threats, which they indeed are for broad sectors of the world’s population; but it is the internationalization of the global environment that produces opportunities for activists from both North and South to engage in concerted collective action. Together, these changes combine into what we call “complex internationalism,” and will describe at greater length in our conclusions.

While some analysts appear to think that globalization is sufficient to produce global social movements, changes in the global environment are not sufficient to produce a transnationalization of collective action. Cognitive change within and relational changes between actors must be the active forces for such a fundamental change. The former can best be seen in the changing perspective of nonstate actors active on the international scene, while the latter can be observed in the formation of sustained networks of transnational activists.

Cognitive Change

Since social movements are “reflective” actors, their international experiences have been critically analyzed. Tactics and frames that appear to succeed in more than one venue have been institutionalized—for example, in the spread of the practice of demonstrating on the occasion of the periodic meetings of the great international institutions, first within Western Europe in the 1990s and then globally, against the World Bank, the IMF, and the WTO. The formation of the “World Social Forum,” created to highlight the distortions of the annual Davos World Economic Forum, eventually produced regional social fora such as the European one that took place in Florence in 2002. Moreover, the tactical adaptation of governmental and police strategies to movement challenges at a transnational level demanded the common elaboration of plans for collective action on the part of activists.

With respect to domestication, although still mainly addressing national governments, many groups of protesters have learned from people like themselves in other countries. This was the case, for instance, for Italian farmers, during the struggle against the implementation of EU quotas on milk production (della Porta, 2003a). Similarly, the local move-
ments of the unemployed have learned to pay greater attention to their transnational connections (Chabanet, 2002; Baglioni, 2003). Though it was “domestic,” the wave of attacks on McDonald’s in France gave rise to a spontaneous wave of similar attacks in other countries and to the popularity of the theme of the “Americanization” of mass culture and commerce.

As for externalization, the “vertical” experience of individual national movements operating internationally has placed many actors in contact with others like themselves and thus encouraged them to develop a more globalized framing of their messages and their domestic appeals. We can see this in the indigenous peoples’ movements throughout Latin America, which have adopted many of the same cognitive frames in countries with little else in common (Yashar, 2005).

Relational Changes

The most striking developments of the last decade have operated through the relational mechanisms that are bringing together national actors in transnational coalitions. The existence of international institutions as common “vertical” targets has helped to produce the “horizontal” formation of transnational coalitions through the networks of activists that form around them. For example, at the European level, networks of organizations of regionalist movements (Hooghe, 2002), women’s organizations (Mazey, 2002), and labor unions (Martin and Ross, 2001) gained some success in the EU. In the same way, indigenous people and human rights organizations have coordinated their efforts and gained access to the United Nations (for a summary, see della Porta and Kriesi, 1999). In parallel, although more slowly, women’s concerns and ecological issues advanced in the United Nations, as well as in the World Bank. National women’s organizations that participated in the UN NGO conferences for women, especially in Beijing in 1995, encountered others like themselves and forged long-lasting transnational coalitions. The same is true of the “counter-summits” organized around the economic summits at Davos and elsewhere. According to a survey of NGOs, a major perceived advantage of the counter-summit is the consolidation of transnational and trans-thematic linkages between transnational movement organizations (Pianta, 2001).

Relations between movements and governments are a major source of change. Social movements do not act in a vacuum, and, in fact, the strongest influences on their behavior and tactics are the behavior and tactics of the governments they challenge. The last decade has shown that governments also imitate one another, therefore leading to increasing similarities in the contexts in which movement campaigns and protests take place.
Increasing interaction facilitates the growth of common identity, and therefore reduces national particularism. One of the major changes in the last half decade has been the adoption of new and more violent tactics on the part of the forces of order against international protesters. This came to a head in Genoa in 2001, but it has been evident since the 1999 protests in Seattle that police forces are following similar strategies in protecting international institutions and conferences.

In summary, reflecting on the successes, but also on the failures of transnational collective action, as well as the experience of working together on temporary campaigns, has led to the creation of transnational organizational structures and the framing of transnational identities. Certainly, social movements have retained their national character, remaining tied to the types of political opportunities present in individual states; but they have also increasingly interacted transnationally. As has been noted, if social movements are to work with success in supranational arenas, they must develop a base of cross-national resources and global strategies that will be significantly different from those deployed in national arenas (Smith, Pagnucco, and Romeril, 1994:126). These arenas offer activists of different world regions the opportunity to meet, form organizational networks, coordinate activity, and construct global frames and programs (Passy, 1999; Smith, 1999).

EMERGING FORMS AND DYNAMICS OF TRANSNATIONAL CONTENTION

All four forms of transnationalization described above facilitate the spread of movements targeting international institutions, practices, and relationships, producing a growing concern with global issues. In the last few years, research has begun to develop on the ways in which transnational collective action is organized and on how transnational conflict and alliance structures are formed. Knowledge has increased, for example, regarding the lobbying efforts of international NGOs or networks of NGOs, working patiently within the ambit of international institutions (O’Brien et al., 2000); on the construction of international treaties and agreements with the active participation of transnational actors (Klotz, 1996; Price, 1997; 1998); on the service or information-based politics of foreign NGOs or networks within individual societies that are not their own (Keck and Sikkink, 1998); on the framing of domestic protest activities against “globalization” without significant foreign participation (such as the 1995 Chiapas rebellion against the Mexican government, framed against the handy symbol of NAFTA [Olesen 2003]); on the actions of local movement actors active on global issues, such as local social fora
(Andretta et al., 2002 and 2003); and on transnationally organized contentious claims-making against international economic actors, institutions, and states (Andretta et al.; also della Porta, 2003b).

Building on this knowledge, but adding new elements of research, the chapters collected in this volume pose one or more of the following questions:

- What are the organizational forms that have developed to connect very loose networks of activists (“movements of movements,” as they have been called)? What is the role of the Internet (“the net of the networks”)?
- How do repertoires of protest adapt to address institutions with low democratic accountability and transparency? To what extent are movements able to build new public spheres, or arenas, for critical political debates?
- Are movement identities undergoing changes in their content and structure as the result of transnational exposure and activism? Is there a return to “materialistic” concerns? Is tolerance for internal differences growing? Is the opposition to neoliberal globalization an emerging master-frame?
- What are the main resources (knowledge, capacity for disruption, legitimacy, links to institutional actors, etc.) that movements mobilize in order to address the political claims in a complex system of governance? Where do social movements find their “social capital”?
- How do national (or even local) political opportunities influence the strategies of social movements that are active on global issues? Are the political parties of the Left still perceived as potential allies? And what are the differences between movements’ adaptation to multi-level governance at the center and at the periphery?

Looking at the effects of the development of conflicts over global issues at the domestic level, as well as at the transnational dynamics of contention, the contributions to this volume begin to provide responses to these questions.

With respect to organizational structure, they clearly indicate that recent forms of transnational contention are far from exclusively organized around transnational social movement organizations. Instead, they are rooted at the local and national level, turning simultaneously to various governmental levels. In particular, transnational mobilizations create linkages between different social and political actors: not only do domestic and international populations of movement organizations interact (see Johnson and McCarthy in this volume), but coalitions involving local groups are formed through local social fora and changes in the framing
of domestic political conflicts. New technologies reduce the costs of participating in transnational networks, even for small local groups, helping in the development of global protest campaigns.

Also at the local level, “global social justice” has become a master-frame of new mobilizations, including those addressing the environment and the conditions and rights of women and workers, native people, peasants, and children (see Diani in this volume). This in turn produces loosely coupled transnational networks that organize around particular campaigns or series of campaigns, using a variety of forms of protests, adopting and adapting repertoires of protest from the traditions of different movements. Specific concerns with women’s rights, labor issues, the defense of the environment, and opposition to war survive, but are bridged together in the opposition against “neoliberal globalization.” In order to keep different groups together, “tolerant” inclusive identities develop, stressing differences as a positive quality of the movement.

As for the repertoire of action, after years of using more moderate tactics, a new propensity for “taking people to the street” has developed, in particular, with the development of forms of civil disobedience. Yet, protest is also combined with educational campaigns, comic presentations, and attention to the mass media, stressing not only the power in numbers but also the importance of the presentation and diffusion of the message (on the importance of media work for ATTAC, see Felix Kolb’s contribution to this volume). Whether a qualitatively new repertoire of contention has developed around transnational contention remains to be seen, but what is clear is that new targets, new frames, and new combinations of constituencies have produced major innovations in the existing repertoire. As we will see in this volume, this evolution modifies trends that have been observed in contentious politics at the domestic level in many countries:

- If social movement organizations appeared increasingly institutionalized and bureaucratic during the 1980s and 1990s, new types of loose organizational structures have emerged around the issue of global justice, with a capacity to penetrate the public sphere, bringing new issues into the public sphere;
- if movement strategies appeared increasingly moderate and contained, direct action and civil disobedience have combined with them, increasing the disruptiveness of protest;
- if social movement discourses appeared to privilege specialization, they have recently shown a taste for more general issues.

What do social movement scholars have to teach in response to these changes? Explanations for these new developments can be found in the
resources and opportunities available to movements—as the social movement literature suggests. But these changes can only be captured if we shift from a static to a more dynamic definition of resources and opportunities: for example, from resources and opportunities as “they are,” to resources and opportunities as they are perceived and constructed by the activists; from specific collective action frames to the process of framing entire episodes, the actors, and the issues within them; and from studying individual forms of collective action to the process of innovation and interaction between challengers and their opponents (della Porta, 1995:9–14; della Porta and Diani, 1999:223–24; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, 2001: ch. 2).

In terms of the mobilization of resources, two emerging challenges for movements can be mentioned. First, the fragmentation in the social structure has increased social heterogeneity, in particular with a decline of the social groups (the working class, but also the “new middle class”) that had provided the social bases for many previous movements. Second, an increasingly individualized culture has been read as reducing the bases for solidarity values in the society, therefore increasing a tendency to free-riderism and diminishing the propensity for collective action.

However, our findings suggest that transnational mobilization is facilitated by the adaptation of movement strategies to the changing environment (including a shift in the type of resources available to challengers). In particular, the flexible networks that have been encouraged by a looser and less crystallized social structure make it possible to connect heterogeneous social bases with movement organizations inherited from previous waves of protest. At the same time, a redefinition of political involvement that emphasizes diversity and subjectivity (see chapter 8 in this volume) taps into cultural changes—which some have called “postmodern”—that build on the thesis that “the personal is political.” In this way, “apolitical” personal lifestyle changes that are becoming common to many young people across the globe have become an intangible but rich source of movement mobilization.

Similarly, if we look at political opportunities, both the supranational and the national levels appear to be quite closed in traditional terms. On the one hand, even the most developed among the international institutions lack the basic features of democratic responsiveness and accountability—granting at best informal and limited access to movement organizations or, more generally, to citizens. On the other hand, the traditional allies of social movements, the left-wing parties, have been far from supportive of recent protests, both in their content and forms. But here again, recent mobilizations have attempted to redefine the concept of politics, putting an emphasis on the role of “politics from below,” and expressing a strong distrust of representative institutions. Addressing
public opinion directly, the activists seem to attempt (with some success) to create public spaces that are autonomous from the political parties, but also from the commercial logic of the mass media. That is, faced with few institutional opportunities, the activists aim at redefining politics.

**THIS VOLUME**

The chapters collected in this volume address these theoretical issues on the basis of empirical studies of contemporary social movements and their interactions with opponents, authorities, and international institutions. Global protest campaigns, counter-summits, cross-sectoral alliances among movements and NGOs, the refraction of transnational protest activity into the domestic arena: these are some promising research subjects that can help to better specify and operationalize the dynamics sketched above.

This volume builds on a rich tradition of scholarly collaboration that goes back over fifteen years to a meeting of social movement scholars at the Free University of Amsterdam in 1986. At that time, distinct research traditions divided social movement scholarship among Europeans and Americans, sociologists and political scientists, advocates of “new social movement theory” and of resource mobilization (Klandermans and Tarrow, 1988). The Amsterdam meeting set out to bridge those gaps. It not only succeeded in producing a much-read volume (Klandermans et al., 1988), but it gave rise to an international book series, *International Social Movement Research*, and created a loosely linked international network of social movement scholars who met every few years, renewed and broadened their composition, and helped set the agenda for social movement research for years to come (Klandermans et al., 1988; McAdam et al., 1996; della Porta, Kriesi, and Rucht, 1999; Diani and McAdam, 2003). This volume is dedicated to the memory of our friend and colleague, Alberto Melucci, who was part of the first “Amsterdam” generation, and whose work has influenced many of us.

While some research focused in the past on transnational campaigns and, more recently, on the rise of a global justice movement, this volume aims at linking local and global conflicts by looking at the way in which global issues are transforming local and national movements, as well as at the interaction between local, national, and supranational movement organizations. Using recent cases of transnational contention—from the European Social Forum in Florence to the Argentinean human rights movement and British environmentalists, from movement networks in Bristol and Glasgow to the Zapatistas—the chapters presented in the volume adapt the concepts and hypotheses developed in the social move-
ment literature to what appears to be a new cycle of protest developing around the globe, after the “low ebb” of mobilization in the last decade.

Part I of the book contains two chapters devoted to the analysis of the effects of the emergence of a “global vision” of conflict at the local and national level. We will show how global justice issues affect local and national movement organizations, first by helping to structure local movement networks and then by widening the issue scope of national organizations. Next, we analyze how activists in transnational protest campaigns engage in collective action at the local level, developing a multilevel challenge to traditional politics. Finally, we show how transnational movement organizations adapt to national opportunities, helping to diffuse concern over global injustice at home.

In particular, in chapter 2, Christopher Rootes discusses the degree and forms of transnationalization in the environmental movement. Using rich databases on the British case, the chapter assesses a limited transnationalization in terms of protest action as well as organizational structures. In-depth analysis of some movement organizations points, however, to the changing character of the British environmental movement as it wrestles with the challenges presented by its need to act locally while at the same time increasingly recognizing the growing importance of transnational economic and political institutions.

In chapter 3, Mario Diani addresses the general question of whether and to what extent transnational issues, such as North–South inequalities, third world debt, or globalization processes, affect local politics and the structure of local civil society in West European countries. On the basis of evidence coming from structured interviews conducted with 124 organizations in Glasgow and 134 organizations in Bristol, the author stresses the influence of global issues on the network structure of the groups, suggesting that interest in transnational issues does indeed shape the structure of civil society networks.

In part II, we turn to the processes through which domestic contention diffuses to other countries and to the international level. In chapter 4, Erik Johnson and John McCarthy look at the interactions between national and transnational social movement organizations. Comparing the coevolution of the populations of transnational environmental movement organizations with the national populations of environmental movement organizations in the United States (based on various issues of the *Yearbook of International Organizations*, and the *Encyclopedia of Associations, National Organizations of the U.S.*), with particular attention to the timing of the founding of movement organizations, the chapter discusses the “top-down” versus “bottom-up” hypotheses, stressing the role of state-level movement organizations in stimulating the rise of transnational ones.

In chapter 5, Felix Kolb focuses on the role of social movement organi-
zations in shaping the European debate on global issues. On the basis of research on the successful anti-neoliberal group, ATTAC (combining a content analysis of newspaper coverage with archival sources), the chapter shows how transnational protest, mass media, and organizational strategy interacted in the making of the German branch of this important transnational movement organization.

In chapter 6, Sidney Tarrow and Doug McAdam address the mechanisms and processes through which transnational contention is organized, and in particular on "scale shift," which signifies a shifting trajectory of contention from small to larger arenas (or, in contrast, from larger to smaller ones). The authors specify this process through four main mechanisms and two alternative paths ("brokerage" and "diffusion") and speculate about the properties and implications of each for the durability of trajectories of mobilization. Each of these paths is illustrated with well-known cases of scale shift, ranging from the American civil rights movement to the Zapatista network and the nuclear freeze movement.

Part III turns to various patterns of the internationalization of contentious politics. In chapter 7, Kathryn Sikkink addresses the question of how the interaction of national and international political opportunity structures influences the strategies of social movements that are active on global issues. On the basis of a series of case studies, especially in Latin America, the chapter discusses how activists, aware of the possibilities created by this dynamic interaction, choose strategies attuned to opportunities at both the international and domestic levels. Using the basic idea of closed and open structures at the domestic and international level as an analytical starting point, it suggests four different characteristic patterns of activism, linking them with different policy issues (such as human rights, trade, and money).

Donatella della Porta, in chapter 8, discusses the conception of democracy and politics in the movement for "globalization from below." Using data from a survey with 2,800 activists of different nationalities who took part in the European Social Forum in Florence, and focus groups of activists in Florence, it discusses the movement's responses to challenges related to various aspects of transnationalization, looking at some characteristics of "global activists," such as their involvement in complex political and social networks and their range of previous experiences of political participation. Finally, the chapter addresses the activists' definition of politics, looking both at their criticisms of representative democracy and their image of a democracy "in movement."

Lance Bennett, in chapter 9, contrasts "traditional" and "new" patterns of transnational activism. Looking at the movement organized loosely around "global justice" issues, the author suggests that it challenges ear-
lier accounts of transnational activism cast largely in terms of NGO-centered, single-issue policy networks that run centrally organized campaigns based on brokered coalitions, aimed mainly at policy reforms. The new transnational movement is instead described as composed of loose activist networks adopting self-organizing communication technologies and advocating multiple issues, multiple goals, and inclusive identities. The implications of the emerging organizational model for political effectiveness and democracy-building are discussed.

The conclusion addresses three main issues. First, we look at how the international environment intersects with globalization to produce a system that we call “complex internationalism,” in which states, international institutions, and nonstate actors regularly interact around issues of global importance. Second, we turn to the progress that has been made in scholars’ understanding of transnational contention since the first studies of the phenomenon appeared in the 1990s. Finally, we turn to some of the unresolved and recently opened issues in transnational contention, such as the rise of militant political Islam and the apparent turn of the United States to a more hegemonic project that threatens much of the progress in multilateral governance made over the last few decades.